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Comment décentraliser la politique européenne de concurrence ?

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  • Thibaud Vergé
  • Estelle Malavolti-Grimal
  • Frédéric Loss

Abstract

[eng] This article focuses on decentralized implementation of European Union competition policy. Delegating the control of interfirm agreements makes it possible to benefit from better local information. However , because of conflicts of interest, decisions taken may not be in line with overall economic welfare. We show that this problem can be alleviated when the central authority delegates auditing but retains decision-making control. However, the central authority must make concessions : it must sometimes follow the national authority’s recommendations in order to give the latter adequate incentives to collect information. [fre] Cet article étudie la décentralisation de la politique européenne de concurrence. Déléguer le contrôle des accords entre entreprises permet de bénéficier de la meilleure connaissance du marché local de l’autorité nationale. En revanche, ceci induit une perte de contrôle sur les décisions prises, pouvant nuire au bien-être global du fait de l’existence potentielle de conflits d’intérêt . Comme nous le montrons ici, ce problème peut être en partie supprimé lorsque l’autorité centrale délègue la réalisation de l’audit mais garde le contrôle de la prise de décision. L’autorité centrale doit néanmoins faire des concessions en suivant parfois les recommandations de l’autorité nationale, pour donner à celle-ci des incitations suffisantes à aller rechercher l’information.

Suggested Citation

  • Thibaud Vergé & Estelle Malavolti-Grimal & Frédéric Loss, 2007. "Comment décentraliser la politique européenne de concurrence ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 178(2), pages 115-124.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2007_num_178_2_7645
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2007.7645
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2007.7645
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Loss, Frederic & Malavolti-Grimal, Estelle & Verge, Thibaud & Berges-Sennou, Fabian, 2008. "European competition policy modernization: From notifications to legal exception," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 77-98, January.
    2. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    3. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    4. Petros C. MAVROIDIS & Damien J. NEVEN, 2000. "The Modernisation of EU Competition Policy : Making the Network Operate," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 00.17, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    5. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Pedro P. Barros & Steffen H. Hoernig, 2018. "Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(3), pages 451-472, May.
    7. Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Looking behind the curtain--effects from modernization of European Union competition policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 613-624, August.
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