European Competition Policy Modernization : From Notifications to Legal Exception
Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 came into force on the 1st of May 2004 replacing themandatory notification of agreements between firms by a regime of ex post monitoring.This paper provides a theoretical justification for this shift based on the competitionauthority’s accuracy of judgement. We show that ex post monitoring dominates whenthe competition authority’s probability of error if low enough. We also investigate thetwo other existing legal systems, i.e. block exemptions and black list, and show that theyshould be preferred when the competition authority’s beliefs about the welfare impact ofthe agreements are very optimistic or very pessimistic.
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