Ex post or ex ante? On the optimal timing of merger control
We study the optimal timing of merger control by comparing the pre-and post closing enforcement. Mergers have both pro- and anticompetitive effects, and the parties(the agency and the merging firms) veri able information on them is endogenous: it depends on the timing of the merger control, as well as on some investment in evidence production. The ex post enforcement turns out optimal whenever the costs of providing veri able information on both efficiency gains and market power are sufficiently low, regardless of whether the fi rms know ex ante or not their true merger type.
|Date of creation:||2013|
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- Chongwoo Choe & Chander Shekhar, 2008.
"Compulsory Or Voluntary Pre-Merger Notification? Theory And Some Evidence,"
Monash Economics Working Papers
20/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
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- Chongwoo, Choe & Shekhar, Chander, 2009. "Compulsory or Voluntary Pre-merger Notification? Theory and Some Evidence," MPRA Paper 13450, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti & Thibaud Vergé & Fabian Bergès-Sennou, 2008.
"European competition policy modernization : from notifications to legal exception,"
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- Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti-Grimal & Thibaud Vergé & Fabian Bergès-Sennou, 2005. "European Competition Policy Modernization : From Notifications to Legal Exception," Working Papers 2005-38, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlöf, Johan N. M., 2003.
"On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lagerlof, Johan N.M. & Heidhues, Paul, 2005. "On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 803-827, December.
- Johan Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2002. "On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-08, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2004. "On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/24, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Oct 2004.
- Ottaviani, Marco & Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2011. "Ex ante or ex post competition policy? A progress report," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 356-359, May.
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