Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders
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- Winand Emons, 2004. "Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(3), pages 496-502, July.
- Emons, Winand, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 3667, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Cited by:
- Emons, Winand, 2007.
"Escalating penalties for repeat offenders,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 170-178.
- Winand Emons, "undated". "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1005, American Law & Economics Association.
- Emons, Winand, 2003. "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 4131, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2003. "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0315, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Gregory DeAngelo & Winand Emons & Beth Freeborn & Hannes Lang, 2017.
"Penalty Structures And Deterrence In A Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1833-1867, October.
- Anderson, Lisa R. & DeAngelo, Gregory & Emons, Winand & Freeborn, Beth & Lang, Hannes, 2015. "Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 10576, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Gregory DeAngelo & Winand Emons & Beth Freeborn & Hannes Lang, 2015. "Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence," Diskussionsschriften dp1505, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Matthew Baker & Thomas Miceli, 2005.
"Credible Criminal Enforcement,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 5-15, July.
- Matthew J. Baker & Thomas J. Miceli, 2003. "Credible Criminal Enforcement," Working papers 2003-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Deterrence and Incapacitation Models of Criminal Punishment: Can the Twain Meet?," Working papers 2009-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Tim Friehe, 2009. "Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 165-183, June.
- Mungan, Murat C., 2010. "Repeat offenders: If they learn, we punish them more severely," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 173-177, June.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2005:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Miceli Thomas J., 2012.
"Deterred or Detained? A Unified Model of Criminal Punishment,"
Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, March.
- Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Deterred or Detained? A Unified Model of Criminal Punishment," Working papers 2009-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Miceli Thomas J. & Bucci Catherine, 2005.
"A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders,"
Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 71-80, April.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci, 2004. "A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Working papers 2004-39, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Loss, Frederic & Malavolti-Grimal, Estelle & Verge, Thibaud & Berges-Sennou, Fabian, 2008.
"European competition policy modernization: From notifications to legal exception,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 77-98, January.
- Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti-Grimal & Thibaud Vergé & Fabian Bergès-Sennou, 2005. "European Competition Policy Modernization : From Notifications to Legal Exception," Working Papers 2005-38, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti & Thibaud Vergé & Fabian Bergès-Sennou, 2008. "European competition policy modernization : from notifications to legal exception," Post-Print hal-01021575, HAL.
- Wolfgang Eggert & Steffen Minter & Maximilian Stephan & Handirk Ungern-Sternberg, 2017. "Sanctions for repeat offenders: a question of wealth?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(5), pages 467-482, November.
- Stan Miles & Derek Pyne, 2015. "Deterring repeat offenders with escalating penalty schedules: a Bayesian approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 229-250, August.
- Roger Bowles & Chrisostomos Florackis, 2012. "Impatience, reputation and offending," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(2), pages 177-187, January.
- Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "The use of warnings in the presence of errors," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 191-201, September.
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More about this item
Keywords
crime and punishment; repeat offenders; subgame perfection;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-LAW-2002-11-04 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2002-11-20 (Microeconomics)
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