Elected vs appointed public law enforcers
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More about this item
Keywordslaw enforcement; deterrence; monetary sanctions; punishment; electoral competition; democracy; rent seeking; dictature;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-11-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2013-11-09 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2013-11-09 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-NPS-2013-11-09 (Nonprofit & Public Sector)
- NEP-PBE-2013-11-09 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-11-09 (Positive Political Economics)
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