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Is there an electoral-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina

  • Meloni, Osvaldo

In the last three decades Argentina tripled its crime rate boosting safety at the top of mayor concerns of Argentineans which leaves open the question about the behavior of incumbent governors of the 23 provinces about anti-crime measures in the proximity of elections. How do incumbent governors react to escalating crime as elections come closer? This paper investigates electorally-motivated crime rate fluctuations in Argentina for the period 1984-2007. District–level dynamic panel data reveals the existence of an electoral cycle in the total crime rate as well as in property crimes.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40177.

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Date of creation: 19 Jun 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40177
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  1. Ana María Cerro & Osvaldo Meloni, 2005. "Determinants of the Crime Rate in Argentina during the 90's," Law and Economics 0504001, EconWPA.
  2. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
  3. Meloni, Osvaldo, 2011. "Budget Manipulation and Vertical Fiscal Imbalance," MPRA Paper 50694, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Andrew Dyke, 2007. "Electoral cycles in the administration of criminal justice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 417-437, December.
  5. Daniel Lema, 2008. "Conditional political budget cycles in Argentine provinces," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 389, Universidad del CEMA.
  6. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1986. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, 2013. "Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 741-756, July.
  8. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2005. "Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 11085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
  10. Levitt, Steven D, 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 270-90, June.
  11. H. Naci Mocan & Turan G. Bali, 2010. "Asymmetric Crime Cycles," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 899-911, November.
  12. Marcela Eslava, 2006. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: Survey," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 40058, Inter-American Development Bank.
  13. Mark P. Jones & Osvaldo Meloni & Mariano Tommasi, 2012. "Voters as Fiscal Liberals: Incentives and Accountability in Federal Systems," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 135-156, 07.
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