IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/40177.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Is there an electoral-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina

Author

Listed:
  • Meloni, Osvaldo

Abstract

In the last three decades Argentina tripled its crime rate boosting safety at the top of mayor concerns of Argentineans which leaves open the question about the behavior of incumbent governors of the 23 provinces about anti-crime measures in the proximity of elections. How do incumbent governors react to escalating crime as elections come closer? This paper investigates electorally-motivated crime rate fluctuations in Argentina for the period 1984-2007. District–level dynamic panel data reveals the existence of an electoral cycle in the total crime rate as well as in property crimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Meloni, Osvaldo, 2012. "Is there an electoral-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina," MPRA Paper 40177, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40177
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40177/1/MPRA_paper_40177.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Meloni, Osvaldo, 2011. "Budget Manipulation and Vertical Fiscal Imbalance," MPRA Paper 50694, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Daniel Lema, 2008. "Conditional political budget cycles in Argentine provinces," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 389, Universidad del CEMA.
    3. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
    4. Andrew Dyke, 2007. "Electoral cycles in the administration of criminal justice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 417-437, December.
    5. Eslava, Marcela, 2006. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: Survey," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3343, Inter-American Development Bank.
    6. Justin McCrary, 2002. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1236-1243, September.
    7. Levitt, Steven D, 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 270-290, June.
    8. H. Naci Mocan & Turan G. Bali, 2010. "Asymmetric Crime Cycles," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 899-911, November.
    9. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
    10. Galli, Emma & Rossi, Stefania P S, 2002. "Political Budget Cycles: The Case of the Western German Lander," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(3-4), pages 283-303, March.
    11. Ana María Cerro & Osvaldo Meloni, 2000. "Determinants of the crime rate in Argentina during the '90s," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 27(2 Year 20), pages 297-311, December.
    12. Marcela Eslava, 2006. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: Survey," Research Department Publications 4487, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    13. Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, 2013. "Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 741-756, July.
    14. Mark P. Jones & Osvaldo Meloni & Mariano Tommasi, 2012. "Voters as Fiscal Liberals: Incentives and Accountability in Federal Systems," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 135-156, July.
    15. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2005. "Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 11085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2013. "Elected vs appointed public law enforcers," Working Papers 2013-06, CRESE.
    2. Ursula E. Daxecker & Brandon C. Prins, 2016. "The politicization of crime: electoral competition and the supply of maritime piracy in Indonesia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(3), pages 375-393, December.
    3. Julien Vandernoot & Jonathan Bauweraerts & Antoine Buchet, 2019. "Do elections influence taxation?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(2), pages 854-865.
    4. Guillermina Marto & Leandro Nallar, 2019. "“Que se vayan todos”: Null and Blank Votes in Argentine Provinces (1983-2007)," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4172, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    5. Meloni, Osvaldo, 2014. "Does poverty relief spending reduce crime? Evidence from Argentina," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 28-38.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Osvaldo Meloni, 2018. "s there an electorally-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2), pages 1102-1110.
    2. Hayo, Bernd & Neumeier, Florian, 2014. "Political leaders' socioeconomic background and fiscal performance in Germany," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 184-205.
    3. Meloni, Osvaldo, 2011. "Budget Manipulation and Vertical Fiscal Imbalance," MPRA Paper 50694, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Velibor Mačkić, 2014. "Političko-proračunski ciklusi na uzorku hrvatskih gradova," EFZG Working Papers Series 1401, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb.
    5. Pablo Garofalo & Daniel Lema & Jorge M. Streb, 2020. "Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: The influence of political alignment," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 305-334, July.
    6. Lopez Uribe, Maria del Pilar, 2013. "Roads or Schools? Political Budget Cycles with different types of voters," MPRA Paper 50529, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Ma. Guillamón & Francisco Bastida & Bernardino Benito, 2013. "The electoral budget cycle on municipal police expenditure," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 447-469, December.
    8. Furdas, Marina & Homolkova, Katerina & Kis-Katos, Krisztina, 2015. "Local Political Budget Cycles in a Federation: Evidence from West German Cities," IZA Discussion Papers 8798, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Vergne, Clémence, 2009. "Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 63-77, March.
    10. Gupta, Sanjeev & Liu, Estelle X. & Mulas-Granados, Carlos, 2016. "Now or later? The political economy of public investment in democracies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 101-114.
    11. Toke S. Aidt & Francisco José Veiga & Linda Gonçalves Veiga, 2007. "Election Results and Opportunistic Policies: An Integrated Approach," NIPE Working Papers 24/2007, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    12. Linda Veiga & Francisco Veiga, 2007. "Political business cycles at the municipal level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 45-64, April.
    13. Beate Jochimsen & Robert Lehmann, 2017. "On the political economy of national tax revenue forecasts: evidence from OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 211-230, March.
    14. Foremny, Dirk & Freier, Ronny & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Yeter, Mustafa, 2014. "Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative and the executive," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-099, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    15. Toke Aidt & Francisco Veiga & Linda Veiga, 2011. "Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 21-44, July.
    16. Manuela Krause, 2019. "Communal fees and election cycles: Evidence from German municipalities," ifo Working Paper Series 293, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    17. Matz Dahlberg & Eva Mörk, 2011. "Is There an Election Cycle in Public Employment? Separating Time Effects from Election Year Effects," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 57(3), pages 480-498, September.
    18. Fabio Alvim Klein, 2014. "Do Opportunistic And Partisan Fiscalcycles Come Together?," Anais do XL Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 40th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 060, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    19. García, Israel & Hayo, Bernd, 2021. "Political budget cycles revisited: Testing the signalling process," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    20. Mr. Sanjeev Gupta & Miss Estelle X Liu & Mr. Carlos Mulas-Granados, 2015. "Now or Later? The Political Economy of Public Investment in Democracies," IMF Working Papers 2015/175, International Monetary Fund.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crime; Electoral cycles; Dynamic Panel Data; Argentina;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40177. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.