Is there an electoral-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina
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More about this item
KeywordsCrime; Electoral cycles; Dynamic Panel Data; Argentina;
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2012-07-29 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-POL-2012-07-29 (Positive Political Economics)
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