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Political Leaders’ Socioeconomic Background and Fiscal Performance in Germany

  • Bernd Hayo

    ()

    (University of Marburg)

  • Florian Neumeier

    (University of Marburg)

This paper investigates whether the socioeconomic status of the head of government helps explain fiscal performance. Applying sociological research that attributes differences in people’s ways of thinking and acting to their relative standing within society, we test whether the social status of German prime ministers can help explain differences in fiscal performance among the German Laender. Our empirical findings show that the tenures of prime ministers from a poorer socioeconomic background are associated with higher levels of public spending and debt financing.

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File URL: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/41-2011_hayo.pdf
File Function: Second version, 2011
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Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201141.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201141
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