IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-18-00881.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do elections influence taxation?

Author

Listed:
  • Julien Vandernoot

    () (UMONS - University of Mons)

  • Jonathan Bauweraerts

    () (UMONS - University of Mons)

  • Antoine Buchet

    () (UMONS - University of Mons)

Abstract

This paper focuses on electoral cycles in the Walloon region of Belgium. More specifically, this research analyzes how election years impact fiscal revenues using theoretical frameworks relative to political budget and political fiscal cycles. The object of this research is to show if different results can be observed based on the data of all the municipalities of an area and if these well-known political budget and fiscal cycles can be identified both before and after the election year. Drawing on a panel dataset of 262 Belgian Walloon municipalities from 2001 to 2017, our results indicate that the analysis of all 262 municipalities show similar patterns to previous studies. Notwithstanding, this research also establishes the significant impact of elections on fiscal revenues with a preliminary decrease followed by an increase of tax rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Vandernoot & Jonathan Bauweraerts & Antoine Buchet, 2019. "Do elections influence taxation?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(2), pages 854-865.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00881
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2019/Volume39/EB-19-V39-I2-P83.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fernando Ferreira & Joseph Gyourko, 2009. "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(1), pages 399-422.
    2. Min Shi & Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 29, pages 67-76.
    3. Nuno Baleiras, Rui, 1997. "Electoral defeats and local political expenditure cycles," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 201-207, October.
    4. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
    5. Chortareas, Georgios & Logothetis, Vasileios & Papandreou, Andreas A., 2016. "Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-13.
    6. Sakurai, Sergio N. & Menezes, Naercio A., 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Insper Working Papers wpe_117, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    7. Rosenberg, Jacob, 1992. "Rationality and the Political Business Cycle: The Case of Local Government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 71-81, January.
    8. Meloni, Osvaldo, 2012. "Is there an electoral-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina," MPRA Paper 40177, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Levitt, Steven D, 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 270-290, June.
    10. Hausman, Jerry, 2015. "Specification tests in econometrics," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 38(2), pages 112-134.
    11. Jean Sébastien Pentecôte & Marie-Estelle Binet, 2006. "Structure de l'impôt et cycle électoral au plan municipal," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 174(3), pages 113-127.
    12. Sergio Sakurai & Naercio Menezes-Filho, 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 301-314, October.
    13. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    14. Drazen, Allan & Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 39-52, May.
    15. Ronald Kneebone & Kenneth McKenzie, 2001. "Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian Provinces," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(5), pages 753-774, November.
    16. repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00001 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Aurélia Heurteux, 2017. "Le développement durable : vers un nouveau mode de pilotage des politiques territoriales ? Le cas de la métropole Nice Côte d’Azur," Post-Print hal-02060662, HAL.
    18. Sergio Sakurai & Naercio Menezes-Filho, 2011. "Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 233-247, July.
    19. Marie-Estelle Binet & Jean-Sebastien Pentecote, 2004. "Tax degression and the political budget cycle in French municipalities," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(14), pages 905-908.
    20. Jean-Philippe Cotis & Bruno Crépon & Yannick L'Horty & Bruno Méary, 1998. "Les stabilisateurs automatiques sont-ils encore efficaces ? Le cas de la France dans les années quatre-vingt-dix," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(1), pages 95-118.
    21. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    22. Aurélia Heurteux, 2017. "Le développement durable : vers un nouveau mode de pilotage des politiques territoriales ? Le cas de la métropole Nice Côte d’Azur," Post-Print hal-02059890, HAL.
    23. Héloïse Berkowitz, 2015. "Comment une idée abstraite devient un dispositif de gestion: Le cas du développement durable," Post-Print hal-01205667, HAL.
    24. repec:cup:apsrev:v:65:y:1971:i:01:p:131-143_30 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political budget cycle; electoral cycle; fiscal revenues.;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00881. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.