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Structure de l'impôt et cycle électoral au plan municipal

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  • Marie-Estelle Binet

    () (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte

    () (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

[fre] Cet article s'inscrit dans le champ des choix publics. On y analyse le comportement des élus locaux pendant la durée de leur mandat, en distinguant les périodes électorale et non électorale. Les conditions d’occurrence et les propriétés du cycle budgétaire électoral sont ainsi étudiées au plan municipal. D’abord , un cadre théorique original permet d’éclairer le lien entre la structure de la fiscalité locale et les comportements publics observés à l’échelle communale en France. Une étude empirique est ensuite menée sur l’ensemble des grandes communes françaises à partir d’un modèle dynamique de panel. Les résultats attestent de la manipulation des instruments budgétaires par les élus à l’approche des élections, conformément aux prédictions du modèle théorique. [eng] This article addresses an issue of public-policy choice. We analyze the behavior of local elected officials during their terms of office, with a distinction between election and non-election periods. Accordingly, we examine the conditions of occurrence and the properties of the political business cycle at the municipal level. First, we offer an original theoretical framework to shed light on the link between local tax structure and public-policy behavior observed at the municipal level in France. We then use a dynamic panel-data model to conduct a study of all of France‘s larger communes i.e., municipalities. As forecast by the theoretical model , our results show that elected officials avail themselves of fiscal instruments in the run-up to elections.
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Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Estelle Binet & Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte, 2006. "Structure de l'impôt et cycle électoral au plan municipal," Post-Print halshs-00109689, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00109689
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00109689
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marc Baudry & Matthieu Leprince & Cyriaque Moreau, 2002. "Préférences révélées, bien public local et électeur médian : tests sur données françaises," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 156(5), pages 125-146.
    2. Nuno Baleiras, Rui, 1997. "Electoral defeats and local political expenditure cycles," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 201-207, October.
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    4. Blais, Andre & Nadeau, Richard, 1992. "The Electoral Budget Cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 389-403, December.
    5. Antoni Castells & Alejandro Esteller & Maite Vilalta, 2004. "Full Characterisation of the Political Economy of Fiscal Adjustment: Evidence from Spanish Municipalities," Working Papers 2004/3, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    6. Bun, Maurice J. G. & Kiviet, Jan F., 2003. "On the diminishing returns of higher-order terms in asymptotic expansions of bias," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 145-152, May.
    7. Coronado, Julia Lynn, 1999. "Tax Exemption and State Capital Investment," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(3), pages 473-482, September.
    8. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944.
    9. Barlow, Robin, 1970. "Efficiency Aspects of Local School Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1028-1040, Sept.-Oct.
    10. Coronado, Julia Lynn, 1999. "Tax Exemption and State Capital Investment," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 3), pages 473-82, September.
    11. Baleiras, Rui Nuno & da Silva Costa, Jose, 2004. "To be or not to be in office again: an empirical test of a local political business cycle rationale," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 655-671, September.
    12. Anderson, T. W. & Hsiao, Cheng, 1982. "Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 47-82, January.
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    Keywords

    impôt; cycle électoral; municipalités;

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