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Law enforcement with unlawful investigations and enforcer's liability

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Langlais

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Ken Yahagi

Abstract

This paper presents a theoretical framework for analyzing agency problems in the law enforcement process and governance of law enforcement organizations. Self-interested law enforcement agents, motivated by the desire to lower crime rates, may engage in inappropriate investigations to secure more convictions, often harming individuals in the process (e.g., through aggressive policing or unlawful practices). Meanwhile, a government driven by rent-seeking motives such as maximizing fine revenues may fail to implement effective liability rules to properly discipline these agents. As a result, law enforcement policies may become distorted, leading to enforcement levels that are excessive when dealing with minor harms and insufficient when addressing more serious offenses.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Langlais & Ken Yahagi, 2025. "Law enforcement with unlawful investigations and enforcer's liability," Working Papers hal-05041878, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05041878
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05041878v1
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    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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