The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment If Governments Do Not Maximize Welfare
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- Roger H. Gordon & John D. Wilson, 1999. "Tax Structure and Government Behavior: Implications for Tax Policy," NBER Working Papers 7244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Neumärker, Bernhard & Pech, Gerald, 2010. "Penalties in the theory of equilibrium tax evasion: Solving King John's problem," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2010, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
- Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2013. "Elected vs appointed public law enforcers," Working Papers 2013-06, CRESE.
- D’Antoni, Massimo & Galbiati, Roberto, 2007. "A signaling theory of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 204-218.
- Chiappinelli, Olga, 2016. "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," MPRA Paper 73487, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
- Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September.
- Wielhouwer, Jacco L., 2013. "When is public enforcement of insider trading regulations effective?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 52-60.
- Olga Chiappinelli, 2016. "Political Corruption in the Execution of Public Contracts," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1607, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
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