Penalties in the Theory of Equilibrium Tax Evasion: Solving King Johnâ€™s Problem
Download full text from publisher
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Oberlack, Christoph & Neumärker, Bernhard, 2011. "Economics, institutions and adaptation to climate change," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 04-2011, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
- Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
More about this item
Keywordstax evasion; signaling; optimal punishment;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:39:y:2011:i:1:p:5-24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .