Can Making It Harder to Convict Criminals Ever Reduce Crime?
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Volume (Year): 18 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
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- Ehrlich, Isaac, 1982. "The optimum enforcement of laws and the concept of justice: A positive analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 3-27, June.
- Mast, Brent D & Benson, Bruce L & Rasmussen, David W, 2000. "Entrepreneurial Police and Drug Enforcement Policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(3-4), pages 285-308, September.
- Mohamed Jellal & Nuno Garoupa, 1999. "Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers 401, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Farmer, Amy & Terrell, Dek, 2001. "Crime versus Justice: Is There a Trade-Off?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 345-66, October.
- Benson, B.L. & Kim, I. & Rasmussen, D.W., 1992. "Estimating Deterrence Effects: A Public Choice Perspective on the Economics of Crime Literature," Working Papers 1992_12_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Benson, Bruce L. & Rasmussen, David W. & Kim, Iljoong, 1998. "Deterrence and Public Policy: Trade-Offs in the Allocation of Police Resources," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 77-100, March.
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