Entrepreneurial Police and Drug Enforcement Policy
The hypothesis that drug enforcement is relatively high in local jurisdictions where state laws dictate that police retain seized assets is tested in the context of a reduced-form equation of the supply and demand for drug enforcement. The results are robust across model specifications, some of which directly control for the level of drug use: legislation permitting police to keep seized assets raises drug arrests as a portion of total arrests by about 20 percent and drug arrest rates by about 18 percent. Police bureaucrats apparently desire discretionary budget increases, and they have considerable discretion in determining resource allocation. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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