Red ink in the rearview mirror: local fiscal conditions and the issuance of traffic tickets
Municipalities have revenue motives for enforcing traffic laws in addition to public safety motives because many traffic offenses are punished via fines and the issuing municipality often retains the revenue. Anecdotal evidence supports this revenue motive. We empirically test this revenue motive using panel data on North Carolina counties. We find that significantly more tickets are issued in the year following a decline in revenue, but the issuance of traffic tickets does not decline in years following revenue increases. Our results suggest that tickets are used as a revenue generation tool rather than solely a means to increase public safety. ; Formerly titled: Are traffic tickets countercyclical?
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.stlouisfed.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003.
"Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Case, Anne, 2002. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 3498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tim Besley, 2002. "Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States," IFS Working Papers W02/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- N. Gregory Mankiw, 1987.
"The Optimal Collection of Seigniorage: Theory and Evidence,"
NBER Working Papers
2270, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1987. "The optimal collection of seigniorage : Theory and evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 327-341, September.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1990.
"Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines,"
NBER Working Papers
3429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 133-48, April.
- James M. Poterba & Julio J. Rotemberg, 1988.
"Inflation And Taxation With Optimizing Governments,"
NBER Working Papers
2567, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Poterba, James M & Rotemberg, Julio J, 1990. "Inflation and Taxation with Optimizing Governments," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Poterba, J.M. & Rotemberg, J.J., 1989. "Inflation And Taxation With Optimizing Governments," Working papers 521, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Sobel, Russell S. & Holcombe, Randall G., 1996. "Measuring the Growth and Variability of Tax Bases over the Business Cycle," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 49(4), pages 535-52, December.
- Graves, Philip E. & Lee, Dwight R. & Sexton, Robert L., 1993. "Speed variance, enforcement, and the optimal speed limit," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 237-243.
- Thomas A. Garrett, 2002. "Aggregated vs. disaggregated data in regression analysis: implications for inference," Working Papers 2002-024, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Lave, Charles A, 1985. "Speeding, Coordination, and the 55 MPH Limit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1159-64, December.
- Oates, Wallace E, 1985. "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 748-57, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2006-048. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna Xiao)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.