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Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration

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  • Obstfeld, Maurice

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic model of seigniorage in which economies' equilibrium paths reflect the ongoing strategic interaction between an optimizing government and a rational public. The model extends existing positive models of monetary policy and inflation by explicitly incorporating the intertemporal linkages among budget deficits, debt, and inflation. A central finding is that the public's rational responses to government policies may well create incentives for the government to reduce inflation and the public debt over time. A sufficiently myopic government may, however, provoke a rising equilibrium path of inflation and public debt.

Suggested Citation

  • Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233606, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ucbewp:233606
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.233606
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    Keywords

    Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies;

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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