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Sophisticated monetary policies

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew Atkeson
  • V. V. Chari
  • Patrick J. Kehoe

Abstract

The Ramsey approach to policy analysis finds the best competitive equilibrium given a set of available instruments. This approach is silent about unique implementation, namely designing policies so that the associated competitive equilibrium is unique. This silence is particularly problematic in monetary policy environments where many ways of specifying policy lead to indeterminacy. We show that sophisticated policies which depend on the history of private actions and which can differ on and off the equilibrium path can uniquely implement any desired competitive equilibrium. A large literature has argued that monetary policy should adhere to the Taylor principle to eliminate indeterminacy. Our findings say that adherence to the Taylor principle on these grounds is unnecessary. Finally, we show that sophisticated policies are robust to imperfect information.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Atkeson & V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2008. "Sophisticated monetary policies," Working Papers 659, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:659
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Minneapolis Redux
      by Stephen Williamson in Stephen Williamson: New Monetarist Economics on 2013-12-23 04:47:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Kiley, 2016. "Policy Paradoxes in the New-Keynesian Model," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 21, pages 1-15, July.
    2. Bassetto, Marco & Phelan, Christopher, 2015. "Speculative runs on interest rate pegs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 99-114.
    3. Canzoneri, Matthew & Cumby, Robert & Diba, Behzad, 2010. "The Interaction Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics,in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 17, pages 935-999 Elsevier.
    4. Francesco Bianchi & Leonardo Melosi, 2014. "Dormant Shocks and Fiscal Virtue," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-46.
    5. repec:eee:moneco:v:92:y:2017:i:c:p:47-63 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Olivier Loisel, 2013. "The Implementation of Stabilization Policy," Working Papers 2013-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    7. Fabrizio Perri & Jonathan Heathcote, 2011. "Wealth and Volatility," 2011 Meeting Papers 1065, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Robert E. Hall & Ricardo Reis, 2016. "Achieving Price Stability by Manipulating the Central Bank’s Payment on Reserves," NBER Working Papers 22761, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Duarte, Fernando M., 2016. "How to escape a liquidity trap with interest rate rules," Staff Reports 776, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, revised 01 Dec 2016.
    10. George-Marios Angeletos & Jennifer La'O, 2011. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Informational Frictions," NBER Working Papers 17525, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Bertoli, Simone & Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús, 2012. "Visa Policies, Networks and the Cliff at the Border," IZA Discussion Papers 7094, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    12. Kocherlakota, N., 2012. "Central bank independence and sovereign default," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 16, pages 151-154, April.
    13. Karel R. S. M. Mertens & Morten O. Ravn, 2014. "Fiscal Policy in an Expectations-Driven Liquidity Trap," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1637-1667.
    14. Pedro Teles & Harald Uhlig & João Valle e Azevedo, 2016. "Is Quantity Theory Still Alive?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(591), pages 442-464, March.
    15. Bernardino Adao & Isabel Correia & Pedro Teles, 2011. "Unique Monetary Equilibria with Interest Rate Rules," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 14(3), pages 432-442, July.
    16. Luigi Paciello, 2012. "Monetary Policy and Price Responsiveness to Aggregate Shocks under Rational Inattention," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(7), pages 1375-1399, October.
    17. Simone Bertoli & Jesus Fernandez-Huertas Moraga & Francesc Ortega, 2011. "Immigration Policies and the Ecuadorian Exodus," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 25(1), pages 57-76, March.
    18. Duarte, Fernando M. & Zabai, Anna, 2015. "An interest rate rule to uniquely implement the optimal equilibrium in a liquidity trap," Staff Reports 745, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    19. Mertens, Karel & Ravn, Morten O, 2011. "Credit Channels in a Liquidity Trap," CEPR Discussion Papers 8322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Sánchez-Fung, José R., 2011. "Estimating monetary policy reaction functions for emerging market economies: The case of Brazil," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1730-1738, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy ; Taylor's rule;

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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