A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement
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- Bracco, Emanuele, 2018. "A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 117-120.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsPolitical Budget Cycle; parking tickets; tax collection;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-12-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-ALL-2018-01-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-EUR-2018-01-01 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-POL-2018-01-01 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-TRE-2018-01-01 (Transport Economics)
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