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A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement

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  • Emanuele Bracco

Abstract

With data from 1998 to 2015, we find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This provides evidence that mayors strategically use both tax setting and collection to affect elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Emanuele Bracco, 2017. "A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement," Working Papers 209919534, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:209919534
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    2. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    3. Bracco, Emanuele & Lockwood, Ben & Porcelli, Francesco & Redoano, Michela, 2015. "Intergovernmental grants as signals and the alignment effect: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 78-91.
    4. Emanuele Bracco & Francesco Porcelli & Michela Redoano, 2013. "Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy," CESifo Working Paper Series 4167, CESifo.
    5. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    6. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Post-Print hal-01291401, HAL.
    7. Ma. Guillamón & Francisco Bastida & Bernardino Benito, 2013. "The electoral budget cycle on municipal police expenditure," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 447-469, December.
    8. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    9. Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, 2007. "Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1020-1048, December.
    10. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
    11. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, 2009. "Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 71-90, February.
    12. Bracco, E. & De Paola, M. & Green, C.P., 2015. "Long lasting differences in civic capital: Evidence from a unique immigration event in Italy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 160-173.
    13. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferraresi Massimiliano, 2021. "Political Budget Cycle, Tax Collection, and Yardstick Competition," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(3), pages 1149-1161, July.
    2. Bertoli, Paola & Grembi, Veronica, 2021. "The political cycle of road traffic accidents," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    3. Emanuele Bracco & Marco Alberto De Benedetto & Maurizio Lisciandra, 2024. "Manipulating municipal budgets: unveiling opportunistic behavior of Italian mayors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(3), pages 317-342, March.
    4. Chanif Rizqiyati & Doddy Setiawan, 2022. "Do Regional Heads Utilize Capital Expenditures, Grants, and Social Assistance in the Context of Elections?," Economies, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-15, September.
    5. Bernardino Benito & María-Dolores Guillamón & Ana-María Ríos, 2021. "Political Budget Cycles in Public Revenues: Evidence From Fines," SAGE Open, , vol. 11(4), pages 21582440211, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Budget Cycle; parking tickets; tax collection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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