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Evaluation of a Public Technology-Based Traffic Enforcement Program

Author

Listed:
  • Gila Albert

    (HIT—Holon Institute of Technology, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Technology Management, 52 Golomb St., Holon 58102, Israel)

  • Dimitry Bukchin

    (HIT—Holon Institute of Technology, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Technology Management, 52 Golomb St., Holon 58102, Israel)

  • Tomer Toledo

    (Technion—Israel Institute of Technology, Transportation Research Institute, Haifa 32000, Israel)

Abstract

While police enforcement is a well-known means of reducing traffic violations, it is also recognized that other agents should be involved in creating sustainable deterrence. This paper describes and evaluates the Israeli Road Guards program, a new and unique type of traffic enforcement, which enables simple technology-based enforcement of traffic violations by citizens. In its 24 months of operation, more than 3400 volunteers who submitted over 64,000 violation reports were involved in this program. Each report went through a rigorous evaluation process. More than 80% of the submitted reports were rejected in the various stages of the procedure. In 13.7% of the cases a notice letter was sent, and in 4.3% of cases (reflecting the most severe offenses) a citation was issued by the police. The monthly rate of report submission by the volunteers was at its highest initially, then decreased and stabilized after about six months at 1.4 reports per month. The proportion of active volunteers also decreased over time to a level of 0.26 at the end of the study period. The violation types reported within the program differed substantially from those captured by police enforcement. These differences are likely due to the manner in which each mode of enforcement was performed. The most common violations reported by volunteers were lane deviations, red light running and driving on the roads’ shoulders, which are easily documented by means of video recordings. They are also associated with higher crash risks. Thus, the results show that such public technology-based traffic enforcement, which can be carried out during regular daily driving and does not require anyone to make extra trips, may efficiently complement traditional police enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Gila Albert & Dimitry Bukchin & Tomer Toledo, 2021. "Evaluation of a Public Technology-Based Traffic Enforcement Program," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(21), pages 1-13, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:21:p:11966-:d:667863
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    References listed on IDEAS

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