Economics, institutions and adaptation to climate change
Adaptation to the consequences of climate change has attracted increasing interest as a necessary complement to greenhouse gas mitigation. Economic approaches to climate adaptation are rarely articulated and discussed explicitly despite many benefits of such a framework-level discourse. Therefore, this article investigates how climate adaptation is framed and approached in economics and attempts to contribute to the development of economic frameworks of climate adaptation. First, the paper identifies and critically reviews four major strands of current adaptation economics: estimation of adaptation benefits and costs, strategies for adaptation, the role of markets and governments, and policy instruments for adaptation. While having their merits, serious methodical difficulties prevail. Moreover, the applied neoclassical framing seems too narrow to capture the plethora of governance challenges and normative criteria revealed in adaptation policy discourses and in the multidisciplinary adaptation literature. The second part of this article outlines an institutional economics approach to climate adaptation that addresses caveats in the current state-of-the-art and offers additional concepts to study climate adaptation. Moreover, promising methods and strategies for adaptation research are presented and future research directions suggested. Finally, the paper assesses the normative foundations of climate adaptation economics and their implications for positive adaptation research.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Kollegiengebäde II, Platz der Alten Synagoge, 79085 Freiburg|
Phone: +49 +761 / 203 2301
Fax: +49 +761 / 203 2303
Web page: http://www.wipo.uni-freiburg.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lecocq, Franck & Shalizi, Zmarak, 2007. "Balancing expenditures on mitigation of and adaptation to climate change : an exploration of Issues relevant to developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4299, The World Bank.
- Fankhauser, Samuel & Smith, Joel B. & Tol, Richard S. J., 1999. "Weathering climate change: some simple rules to guide adaptation decisions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 67-78, July.
- Stine Aakre & Dirk Rubbelke, 2010. "Objectives of public economic policy and the adaptation to climate change," Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(6), pages 767-791.
- Neumärker, Bernhard & Pech, Gerald, 2010. "Penalties in the theory of equilibrium tax evasion: Solving King John's problem," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2010, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
- Russell Sobel & Peter Leeson, 2006. "Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 55-73, April.
- de Bruin, Kelly Chloe & Weikard, Hans-Peter & Dellink, Rob, 2011. "The Role of Proactive Adaptation in International Climate Change Mitigation Agreements," CERE Working Papers 2011:9, CERE - the Center for Environmental and Resource Economics.
- Richard S. J. Tol, 2009. "The Economic Effects of Climate Change," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 29-51, Spring.
- World Bank, 2010. "Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change : Synthesis Report," World Bank Other Operational Studies 12750, The World Bank.
- Urvashi Narain & Sergio Margulis & Timothy Essam, 2011. "Estimating costs of adaptation to climate change," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 1001-1019, May.
- Daniel Osberghaus & Astrid Dannenberg & Tim Mennel & Bodo Sturm, 2010.
"The role of the government in adaptation to climate change,"
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy,
Pion Ltd, London, vol. 28(5), pages 834-850, October.
- Daniel Osberghaus & Astrid Dannenberg & Tim Mennel & Bodo Sturm, 2010. "The Role of the Government in Adaptation to Climate Change," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 28(5), pages 834-850, October.
- van den Bergh, Jeroen C. J. M., 2004. "Optimal climate policy is a utopia: from quantitative to qualitative cost-benefit analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 385-393, April.
- Klaus Eisenack & Rebecca Stecker, 2012. "A framework for analyzing climate change adaptations as actions," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 243-260, March.
- William Shughart, 2006. "Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 31-53, April.
- Roger Congleton, 2006. "The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 5-30, April.
- Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 23-49, June.
- Vanberg, Viktor J., 2004. "Market and State: The Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 04/10, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
- Hallegatte, Stephane & Lecocq, Franck & de Perthuis, Christian, 2011. "Designing climate change adaptation policies : an economic framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5568, The World Bank.
- Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, 2006. "Rules rather than discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 101-116, September.
- Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, 2006. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina," NBER Working Papers 12503, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paavola, Jouni & Adger, W. Neil, 2005. "Institutional ecological economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-368, May.
- Bernhard NeumÃ¤rker & Gerald Pech, 2011. "Penalties in the Theory of Equilibrium Tax Evasion: Solving King Johnâ€™s Problem," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(1), pages 5-24, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cenwps:042011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.