The scope of criminal law and criminal sanctions: An economic view and policy implications
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- Paolo Polidori & Désirée Teobaldelli, 2018. "Corporate criminal liability and optimal firm behavior: internal monitoring versus managerial incentives," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 251-284, April.
- Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2013. "Elected vs appointed public law enforcers," Working Papers 2013-06, CRESE.
- Anna Rita Germani & Pasquale Scaramozzino & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2017. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 255-284, December.
- Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2014. "Criminalizing environmental offences: when the prosecutor’s helping hand hurts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 199-219, April.
- Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2015.
"The Structure of Fines in the Light of Political Competition,"
Revue d'économie politique,
Dalloz, vol. 125(5), pages 717-729.
- Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2014. "The structure of fi nes in the light of political competition," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-59, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2015. "The structure of fines in the light of political competition," Post-Print hal-01385985, HAL.
- Éric Langlais, 2010.
"Les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?,"
Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 61(2), pages 263-280.
- Langlais, Eric, 2009.
"les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?
[Are criminals risk-seeking individulas ?]," MPRA Paper 14892, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Langlais, Eric, 2009. "les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?
- Paolo Polidori & D?sir?e Teobaldelli, 2012. "Corporate Criminal Liability and Optimal Behavior by Firms.Internal Monitoring Devices versus Managerial Incentives," Working Papers 1216, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2012.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-LAW-2008-02-09 (Law & Economics)
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