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- Dufwenberg, Martin & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2012. "Legalizing Bribe Giving," CEPR Discussion Papers 9236, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2011. "Legalizing Bribes," SITE Working Paper Series 13, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, revised 12 May 2013.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Abbink, Klaus & Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Gangadharan, Lata & Jain, Tarun, 2014.
"Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 17-28.
- Abbink, Klaus & Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Gangadharan, Lata & Jain, Tarun, 2012. "Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes," MPRA Paper 42176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Klaus Abbink & Utteeyo Dasgupta & Lata Gangadharan & Tarun Jain, 2013. "Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes," Monash Economics Working Papers 62-13, Monash University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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