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Verdrängungspreise auf Telekommunikationsmärkten?

  • Justus Haucap
  • Jörn Kruse

The main argument commonly put forward against retail price deregulation in Germany's telecommunications markets is the concern that otherwise the former monopoly supplier may engage in predatory pricing. And even though some game theoretic models show that predation is sometimes possible, this paper argues that predatory pricing will generally not be profitable. However, prices below average cost and even below marginal cost may be part of a profit-maximizing business strategy without any predatory intent. Therefore, it is often difficult in practice to distinguish between predatory, anti-competitive price cuts and normal, competitive pricing policies. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2004

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Article provided by Verein für Socialpolitik in its journal Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.

Volume (Year): 5 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
Pages: 337-361

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Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:5:y:2004:i:3:p:337-361
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  1. Kruse, Jörn & Haucap, Justus, 2002. "Zuviel Wettbewerb in der Telekommunikation?," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1998 - 2007), ZBW – German National Library of Economics / Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 82(2), pages 92-98.
  2. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
  3. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
  4. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  5. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
  6. Haucap, Justus & kruse, Joern, 2003. "Ex-Ante-Regulierung oder Ex-Post-Aufsicht fuer netzgebundene Industrien?," Working Paper 25/2003, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
  7. Cabral, Luis M B & Riordan, Michael H, 1997. "The Learning Curve, Predation, Antitrust, and Welfare," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 155-69, June.
  8. Justus Haucap, 2003. "Selective Price Cuts and Price Discrimination Bans in Network Industries," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 269-291, December.
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