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Behavioral economics: implications for regulatory behavior

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  • James Cooper
  • William Kovacic

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Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • James Cooper & William Kovacic, 2012. "Behavioral economics: implications for regulatory behavior," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 41-58, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:41:y:2012:i:1:p:41-58
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-011-9180-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, 2011. "Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 1.
    2. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2006. "Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(2), pages 505-540.
    3. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, 2006. "Debiasing through Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 199-242, January.
    4. George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, 2004. "When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information Exchange and Inefficiency in Bargaining," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 37-58, January.
    5. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    6. John A. List, 2003. "Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(1), pages 41-71.
    7. S. Dellavigna., 2011. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 4.
    8. John A. List, 2004. "Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 615-625, March.
    9. Matthew Bennett & Unknown & Amelia Fletcher & Liz Hurley & David Ruck, 2010. "What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition Policy?," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 6.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2015. "Behavioral political economy: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 395-417.
    2. Martin, Brandie L. & Jayakar, Krishna, 2013. "Moving beyond dichotomy: Comparing composite telecommunications regulatory governance indices," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 691-701.
    3. Brennan, Timothy J., 2014. "Behavioral economics and policy evaluation," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(01), pages 89-109, January.
    4. Kuehnhanss, Colin R. & Heyndels, Bruno & Hilken, Katharina, 2015. "Choice in politics: Equivalency framing in economic policy decisions and the influence of expertise," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 360-374.
    5. Francesc Trillas Jané, 2016. "Behavioral Regulatory Agencies," Working Papers wpdea1606, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.
    6. Clifton, Judith & Díaz-Fuentes, Daniel & Fernández-Gutiérrez, Marcos, 2013. "How consumers’ socio-economic background influences satisfaction: Insights for better utility regulation," MPRA Paper 47271, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Davide Pietroni & Sibylla Verdi Hughes, 2016. "Nudge to the future: capitalizing on illusory superiority bias to mitigate temporal discounting," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 15(2), pages 247-264, November.
    8. Michael Collins, J. & Urban, Carly, 2014. "The dark side of sunshine: Regulatory oversight and status quo bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PB), pages 470-486.
    9. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2014. "Behavioral public choice: A survey," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    10. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2014. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5003, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Trillas, Francesc, 2013. "The Institutional Architecture of Regulation and Competition: Spains's 2012 Reform," IESE Research Papers D/1067, IESE Business School.
    12. Judith Clifton & Daniel Díaz-Fuentes & Marcos Fernández-Gutiérrez, 2014. "The impact of socio-economic background on satisfaction: evidence for policy-makers," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 183-206, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; Behavioral economics; Public choice; Administrative law; Competition policy; K23; K21; L40; D72; D73; D03;

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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