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The global citric acid conspiracy: Legal-economic lessons

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  • John M. Connor

    (Department of Agricultural Economics at Purdue University)

Abstract

ADM was at the center of two large global price-fixing conspiracies. Buyers were overcharged $116 to $378 million in the United States. Market structure and corporate management style facilitated these cartels. The criminal prosecutions and defendants' legal strategies were both laudatory, but civil plaintiffs were short-changed. ADM has undergone severe management restructuring, but the effectiveness of apprehending global cartels with national legal enforcement is questionable. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Suggested Citation

  • John M. Connor, 1998. "The global citric acid conspiracy: Legal-economic lessons," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(6), pages 435-452.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:agribz:v:14:y:1998:i:6:p:435-452
    DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1520-6297(199811/12)14:6<435::AID-AGR2>3.0.CO;2-S
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Connor, John M., 1997. "Archer Daniels Midland: Price Fixer To The World," Staff Papers 28653, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    2. Connor, John M., 1998. "What Can We Learn From The Adm Global Price Conspiracies?," Staff Papers 28621, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2008. "The impact of collusion on price behavior: Empirical results from two recent cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1290-1307, November.
    2. John M. Connor, 2004. "Extraterritoriality Of The Sherman Act And Deterrence Of Private International Cartels," Working Papers 04-08, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    3. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Crede, Carsten J., 2020. "Post-cartel tacit collusion: Determinants, consequences, and prevention," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    4. Gregory Werden, 2008. "Assessing the Effects of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 433-451, December.
    5. Bovin, Andreas & Bos, Iwan, 2023. "Market Shares as Collusive Marker: Evidence from the European Truck Industry," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    6. Hüschelrath, Kai, 2009. "Methodologische Grundlagen einer Evaluation von Wettbewerbspolitik," ZEW Discussion Papers 09-084, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. Mihail BUŞU & Bogdan CÎMPAN, 2014. "Screening Methods For The Detection Of Cartels," Network Intelligence Studies, Romanian Foundation for Business Intelligence, Editorial Department, issue 3, pages 21-31, April.
    8. Connor, John M., 1997. "Archer Daniels Midland: Price Fixer To The World," Staff Papers 28653, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    9. Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2011. "The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-35, CIRANO.
    10. Yuliya Bolotova & John M. Connor & Douglas J. Miller, 2007. "Factors influencing the magnitude of cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis of food-industry cartels," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(1), pages 17-33.

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