Screening Methods For The Detection Of Cartels
During their everyday activities, the economic operators conclude a multitude of agreements in tacit or written form, such as: contracts or conventions. Some of these arrangements are absolutely necessary for the development of their current activities. These are agreements which, by respecting the rules of competition, are able to bring benefits to consumers and to the entire economy, as a whole. On the other hand, the economic operators often conclude agreements which are harmful to the economy as well as to the consumers, violating the competition rules. Some examples in this respect are: operators’ agreements on price fixing, on market or customers sharing. Before investigating the violation of competition rules, the relevant authorities should identify the possibility of the existence of such illegalities. The theoretical models for detecting the cartels do represent a proactive tool concerning the antitrust activity of competition authorities. The present paper furnishes a review of the methods for detecting cartels as well as a part of their practical application.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414 Elsevier.
- John M. Connor, 1998. "The global citric acid conspiracy: Legal-economic lessons," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(6), pages 435-452.
- Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May.
- Jacquemin, Alexis & Slade, Margaret E., 1989. "Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 415-473 Elsevier.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cmj:networ:y:2014:i:3:p:21-31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Serghie Dan)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.