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Screening Methods For The Detection Of Cartels

Author

Listed:
  • Mihail BUŞU

    (Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies of Bucharest)

  • Bogdan CÎMPAN

    (Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies of Bucharest)

Abstract

During their everyday activities, the economic operators conclude a multitude of agreements in tacit or written form, such as: contracts or conventions. Some of these arrangements are absolutely necessary for the development of their current activities. These are agreements which, by respecting the rules of competition, are able to bring benefits to consumers and to the entire economy, as a whole. On the other hand, the economic operators often conclude agreements which are harmful to the economy as well as to the consumers, violating the competition rules. Some examples in this respect are: operators’ agreements on price fixing, on market or customers sharing. Before investigating the violation of competition rules, the relevant authorities should identify the possibility of the existence of such illegalities. The theoretical models for detecting the cartels do represent a proactive tool concerning the antitrust activity of competition authorities. The present paper furnishes a review of the methods for detecting cartels as well as a part of their practical application.

Suggested Citation

  • Mihail BUŞU & Bogdan CÎMPAN, 2014. "Screening Methods For The Detection Of Cartels," Network Intelligence Studies, Romanian Foundation for Business Intelligence, Editorial Department, issue 3, pages 21-31, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cmj:networ:y:2014:i:3:p:21-31
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jacquemin, Alexis & Slade, Margaret E., 1989. "Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 415-473, Elsevier.
    2. John M. Connor, 1998. "The global citric acid conspiracy: Legal-economic lessons," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(6), pages 435-452.
    3. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414, Elsevier.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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