The Gains and Losses from Agricultural Concentration: A Critical Survey of the Literature
This paper surveys some potential costs and benefits of increased concentration in agricultural markets in the context of an economic trade-off. The existing industrial organization literature is applied to agricultural markets to provide a more concrete structure for analysis. Although an important part of the debate, market power and the existing empirical literature measuring it are only part of a complete picture and suggestions are made on where this literature could go to increase its impact. Policy frameworks are examined to provide perspective on the relevant theoretical and empirical work.
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Volume (Year): 1 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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