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“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995

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  • John Connor

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  • John Connor, 2001. "“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(1), pages 5-21, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:18:y:2001:i:1:p:5-21
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1026513927396
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dick, Andrew R, 1996. "When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 241-283, April.
    2. Connor, John M., 1997. "Archer Daniels Midland: Price Fixer To The World," Staff Papers 28653, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    3. Connor, John M., 1998. "What Can We Learn From The Adm Global Price Conspiracies?," Staff Papers 28621, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    4. Hay, George A & Kelley, Daniel, 1974. "An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 13-38, April.
    5. Asch, Peter & Seneca, Joseph J, 1975. "Characteristics of Collusive Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 223-237, March.
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