On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities
In this article I investigate three single-shot models of differentiated-products oligopoly. In each model firms choose both output and price. The demand, cost, and spillover demand specifications are quite general, and there are three main results. First, with simultaneous choice there is no pure-strategy noncooperative equilibrium. Second, with output chosen first and announced to all firms before the choice of price, equilibrium sometimes exists, and when it does, it is the same as in a quantity-only model. Third, with price chosen and announced first, equilibrium always exists and is the same as in a price-only model.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 19 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|