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Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets: An Experimental Evaluation


  • Mason, Charles F
  • Phillips, Owen R
  • Nowell, Clifford


Experimental duopolies are analyzed to answer two questions: Are asymmetric duopolies less likely to collude than symmetric duopolies? Is the time it takes to reach an equilibrium affected by asymmetry? In a repeated game where output is the choice , the authors have data for nineteen (respectively, twenty-one) subject pairs where both agents are low-cost (respectively, high-cost) and twenty-five subject pairs where one agent is high-cost and one is low-cost. Subjects make choices for at least thirty-five periods. Results indicate that asymmetric markets are less cooperative and take longer to reach equilibrium than symmetric markets. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Mason, Charles F & Phillips, Owen R & Nowell, Clifford, 1992. "Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets: An Experimental Evaluation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(4), pages 662-670, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:74:y:1992:i:4:p:662-70

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