On the detection of collusion and predation
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mina Baliamoune-Lutz & Stefan Lutz, 2010.
"Pre-emption, Predation, and Minimum Quality Standards,"
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Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 111-123.
- Mina Baliamoune & Stefan Lutz, 2009. "Preemption, Predation, and Minimum Quality Standards," ICER Working Papers 20-2009, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Stephen Martin, 2015. "Areeda–Turner and the Treatment of Exclusionary Pricing under U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(3), pages 229-252, May.
- Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Actions Speak Louder than Words: Econometric Evidence to Target Tacit Collusion in Oligopolistic Markets," Discussion Papers in Economics 16179, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Rainer Nitsche, 2002. "On the Effectiveness of Anit-Predation Rules," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-12, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Sautet Frédéric, 2002. "Kirznerian Economics: Some Policy Implications and Issues," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-23, March.
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