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Areeda-Turner in Two-Sided Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Stefan Behringer
  • Lapo Filistrucchi

Abstract

Areeda and Turner (1975) were the first to argue that a price below marginal costs should be considered a sign of predation. Recognizing that marginal cost data were typically unavailable, the authors concluded that a price below average variable cost should be presumed unlawful. This so-called Areeda-Turner Rule has become the standard to assess claims of predation. We first show that in two-sided markets price cost margins on the two-sides of the market are interrelated and that a monopolist, even in the absence of actual or potential competition, may find it optimal to charge a price below marginal cost on one side of the market. As a result, showing that the price is below average variable cost on one side of the market cannot be considered a sign of predation in such markets. This is in contrast to a recent decision of the Commercial Court of Paris that sanctioned Google for giving away for free its online mapping services. We thus extend the Areeda-Turner rule to two-sided markets. We argue that one should apply the rule by taking into account revenues and costs from both sides of the market. As applications, we analyse three alleged cases of predatory behaviour in the market for daily newspapers. Our examples highlight that applying a one-sided Areeda-Turner rule may lead to assess a perfectly legitimate profit maximizing pricing policy as a predatory attempt.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Behringer & Lapo Filistrucchi, 2014. "Areeda-Turner in Two-Sided Markets," Working Papers - Economics wp2014_10.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
  • Handle: RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2014_10.rdf
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    2. Darmon, Eric & Le Texier, Thomas & Li, Zhiwen & Penard, Thierry, 2025. "Multimarket contact, cross-market externalities and platform competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    3. Jullien, Bruno & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2021. "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    4. Qihong Liu & Daniel Nedelescu & Ji Gu, 2021. "The impact of strategic agents in two-sided markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 195-218, December.
    5. Elias Carroni, 2018. "Poaching in media: Harm to subscribers?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 221-236, June.
    6. Daniel M. Nedelescu, 2025. "The Effects of Conventional Policies on Price Structure and Consumer Surplus in a Two-sided Market–an Economics Experiment," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 173-198, March.
    7. Eric Darmon & Thomas Le Texier & Zhiwen Li & Thierry Pénard, 2019. "Multimarket Contact and Platform Competition: Reassessing the Mutual Forbearance Hypothesis," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 2019-07, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    8. Valentiny, Pál, 2019. "Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásban [Forensic economics]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 134-162.
    9. Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro & Svetlana Golovanova, 2020. "A Unified Presentation Of Competition Analysis In Two‐Sided Markets," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 548-571, July.
    10. Jeroen Hinloopen & Stephen Martin, 2015. "Introduction: 40 Years of Areeda–Turner," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(3), pages 205-207, May.
    11. Andrikopoulos, A. & Dassiou, X., 2018. "Exchange-rate exposure in a “Rule of Three” Model," Working Papers 18/02, Department of Economics, City St George's, University of London.
    12. Juan Manuel Sanchez‐Cartas & Gonzalo León, 2021. "Multisided Platforms And Markets: A Survey Of The Theoretical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 452-487, April.
    13. Michael L. Katz, 2019. "Platform economics and antitrust enforcement: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 138-152, January.
    14. Michael L. Katz, 2019. "Multisided Platforms, Big Data, and a Little Antitrust Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(4), pages 695-716, June.
    15. Amelio, Andrea & Giardino-Karlinger, Liliane & Valletti, Tommaso, 2020. "Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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