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Stochastic stability on general state spaces

  • Newton, Jonathan

This paper studies stochastic stability methods applied to processes on general state spaces. This includes settings in which agents repeatedly interact and choose from an uncountable set of strategies. Dynamics exist for which the stochastically stable states differ from those of any reasonable finite discretization. When there are a finite number of rest points of the unperturbed dynamic, sufficient conditions for analogues of results from the finite state space literature are derived and studied. Illustrative examples are given.

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Paper provided by University of Sydney, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2012-16.

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Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision: Jul 2014
Handle: RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/8898
Contact details of provider: Postal: Sydney, NSW 2006
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  1. Agastya, Murali, 1999. "Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 207-233, December.
  2. Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2005. "Mistakes In Cooperation: The Stochastic Stability Of Edgeworth'S Recontracting," Economics Working Papers we056332, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  3. Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-79, March.
  4. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
  5. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  6. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  7. James Bergin & B. L. Lipman, 1994. "Evolution with state-dependent mutations," Working Papers 199411, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
  8. Newton, Jonathan, 2012. "Coalitional stochastic stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 842-854.
  9. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson & Petyon Young, 2003. "Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000466, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Alan Beggs, 2003. "Waiting Times and Equilibrium Selection," Economics Series Working Papers 142, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  11. Chong, Juin-Kuan & Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck H., 2006. "A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 340-371, May.
  12. van Damme, Eric & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2002. "Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 296-315, October.
  13. Reinhard Selten & Jose Apesteguia, 2002. "Experimentally Observed Imitation and Cooperation in Price Competition on the Circle," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse19_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
  14. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  15. Feinberg Yossi, 2006. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Long-Run Selection," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-26, March.
  16. Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner, 2000. "The evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 35-55, February.
  17. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in bargaining models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 296-328, November.
  18. repec:bla:restud:v:67:y:2000:i:1:p:17-45 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Naidu, Suresh & Hwang, Sung-Ha & Bowles, Samuel, 2010. "Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 31-33, October.
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