Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models
Download full text from publisher
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- BOCHET, Olivier & KLAUS, Bettina & WALZL, Markus, 2007.
"Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2007061, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bochet Olivier & Klaus Bettina & Walzl Markus, 2007. "Dynamic Recontracting processes with Multiple Indivisible Goods," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- H Peyton Young, 2014. "The Evolution of Social Norms," Economics Series Working Papers 726, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Naidu, Suresh & Hwang, Sung-Ha & Bowles, Samuel, 2010. "Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 31-33, October.
- Juana Santamaria-Garcia, 2004. "Equilibrium Selection In The Nash Demand Game. An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-34, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Bagnoli, Lidia & Negroni, Giorgio, 2013. "The evolution of conventions in minimum effort games," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 259-277.
- Julian J. Arevalo, 2005. "Gradual Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda: A Path-Dependent Model," Game Theory and Information 0502004, EconWPA.
- Ross Cressman, 2009. "Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 221-247, June.
- Newton, Jonathan, 2015. "Stochastic stability on general state spaces," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 46-60.
- Nax, Heinrich H., 2015. "Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65426, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Andreozzi, Luciano, 2013. "Learning to be fair," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 181-195.
- repec:syd:wpaper:2123/9993 is not listed on IDEAS
- Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November.
- Hwang, Sung-Ha & Lim, Wooyoung & Neary, Philip & Newton, Jonathan, 2016. "Conventional Contracts, Intentional behavior and Logit Choice: Equality Without Symmetry," Working Papers 2016-13, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Younghwan In, 2005. "A Fictitious-Play Model of Bargaining To Implement the Nash Solution," Departmental Working Papers wp0509, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
- Julián Arévalo, 2004. "Negociación Nash Gradual con Agenda Endógena: Un Modelo Trayectoria-Dependiente," Game Theory and Information 0407001, EconWPA.
- Daniel Wood, 2015. "Informal property rights as stable conventions in hawk-dove games with many players," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 849-873, September.
- Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.
- Andreozzi, Luciano, 2012. "Property rights and investments: An evolutionary approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 1-11.
- Bolle Friedel & Otto Philipp E., 2016. "Matching as a Stochastic Process," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 236(3), pages 323-348, May.
- repec:eee:apmaco:v:297:y:2017:i:c:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Xiudeng Zheng & Ross Cressman & Yi Tao, 2011. "The Diffusion Approximation of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Mean Effective Fixation Time and the Significance of the One-Third Law," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 462-477, September.
- repec:eee:matsoc:v:91:y:2018:i:c:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
- Heinrich Nax, 2015. "Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 1011-1026, November.
- Dai, Darong & Shen, Kunrong, 2012. "A new stationary game equilibrium induced by stochastic group evolution and rational Individual choice," MPRA Paper 40133, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-03-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2003-03-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2003-03-19 (Industrial Organization)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000466. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .