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Norms and power in marketing relationships: Alternative theories and empirical evidence

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  • Berthon, Pierre
  • Pitt, Leyland F.
  • Ewing, Michael T.
  • Bakkeland, Gunnar

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  • Berthon, Pierre & Pitt, Leyland F. & Ewing, Michael T. & Bakkeland, Gunnar, 2003. "Norms and power in marketing relationships: Alternative theories and empirical evidence," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 56(9), pages 699-709, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:56:y:2003:i:9:p:699-709
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    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    3. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    5. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Chao-Hung & Hsu, Li-Chang, 2014. "Building exploration and exploitation in the high-tech industry: The role of relationship learning," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 331-340.
    2. Altinay, Levent & Brookes, Maureen & Madanoglu, Melih & Aktas, Gurhan, 2014. "Franchisees' trust in and satisfaction with franchise partnerships," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(5), pages 722-728.
    3. Brouthers, Lance Eliot & Gao, Yan & Napshin, Stuart, 2014. "Keiretsu centrality — profits and profit stability: A power dependence perspective," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(12), pages 2603-2610.
    4. Gilliland, David I. & Rudd, John M., 2013. "Control of electronic channel affiliates: An exploratory study and research propositions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(12), pages 2650-2656.
    5. Li, Yongqiang & Wang, Xuehua & Huang, Lily & Bai, Xuan, 2013. "How does entrepreneurs' social capital hinder new business development? A relational embeddedness perspective," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(12), pages 2418-2424.
    6. Lee, Nick & Gilliland, David I. & Bello, Daniel C. & Osmonbekov, Talai, 2011. "When electronic management tools work - and don't work - in social-based distribution channels: A study of IT manufacturers and resellers," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(10), pages 1017-1024, October.
    7. Lin Li & Hongdong Guo & Jos Bijman & Nico Heerink, 2018. "The influence of uncertainty on the choice of business relationships: The case of vegetable farmers in China," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(3), pages 597-615, June.
    8. Badrinarayanan, Vishag & Suh, Taewon & Kim, Kyung-Min, 2016. "Brand resonance in franchising relationships: A franchisee-based perspective," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(10), pages 3943-3950.
    9. Carole Donada & Gwenaëlle Nogatchewsky, 2008. "Partenariat, vassalité, marché et seigneurie : 4 configurations de contrôle client-fournisseur," Post-Print halshs-00340597, HAL.
    10. Martin C. Schleper & Constantin Blome & David A. Wuttke, 2017. "The Dark Side of Buyer Power: Supplier Exploitation and the Role of Ethical Climates," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 97-114, January.
    11. Marcos, Javier & Prior, Daniel D, 2017. "Buyer-supplier relationship decline: A norms-based perspective," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 14-23.
    12. Kolstad, Ivar, 2007. "The evolution of social norms: With managerial implications," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 58-72, February.
    13. Prior, Daniel D. & Keränen, Joona, 2020. "Revisiting contemporary issues in B2B marketing: It's not just about artificial intelligence," Australasian marketing journal, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 83-89.
    14. He, Qile & Ghobadian, Abby & Gallear, David, 2013. "Knowledge acquisition in supply chain partnerships: The role of power," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 605-618.
    15. Woldeyohanes Tena Gizaw & Professor Niu xiongying, 2021. "Farmers’ Cooperative Members’ Perception on Agency Problems and Its Impact on their Satisfaction in Ethiopia: The Moderating Role of members’ Participation on Cooperative Governance," International Journal of Science and Business, IJSAB International, vol. 5(7), pages 186-214.

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