Social norms: Does it matter whether agents are rational or boundedly rational?
The motivation for this paper is to consider whether changes in conformity over time are likely to depend critically on agent behavior. To get some insight on this we use the framework of Chamley [Chamley, C., 1999. Coordinating regime switches. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 869-905] and compare the dynamic of conformity in a setting where agents are rational to one where they are adaptive (or backward looking). This is followed by a more general discussion on the issue.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October.
- Myrna Wooders & Edward Cartwright & Reinhard Selten, 2005.
"Behavioral Conformity in Games with Many Players,"
Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers
0513, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull, 1999.
"Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," Working Paper Series 476, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Lindbeck, Assar, 1997.
"Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior,"
622, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Lindbeck, A., 1994.
"Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms,"
589, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Lindbeck, Assar, 1995. " Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 477-94, December.
- Lindbeck, Assar, 1995. "Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Working Paper Series 441, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Christophe Chamley, 1999. "Coordinating Regime Switches," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 869-905.
- Caplin, A. & Leahy, J., 1992.
"Business as Usual, Market Crashes, and Wisdom after the Fact,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1594, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 1994. "Business as Usual, Market Crashes, and Wisdom after the Fact," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 548-65, June.
- Nyborg, Karine & Rege, Mari, 2003. "On social norms: the evolution of considerate smoking behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 323-340, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998.
"The Theory of Learning in Games,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, March.
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörg Weibull, 2003.
"Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
931, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ishida, Junichiro, 2003. "The role of social norms in a model of marriage and divorce," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 131-142, May.
- Ofer H. Azar, 2003.
"What sustains social norms and how they evolve? The case of tipping,"
- Azar, Ofer H., 2004. "What sustains social norms and how they evolve?: The case of tipping," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 49-64, May.
- George A. Akerlof, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment may be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-775.
- Wenzel, Michael, 2004. "An analysis of norm processes in tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 213-228, April.
- Kolstad, Ivar, 2007. "The evolution of social norms: With managerial implications," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 58-72, February.
- Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
- Mari Rege, 2004. "Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(1), pages 65-77, 02.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:38:y:2009:i:3:p:403-410. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.