On the Emergence of Social Conformity
We consider a dynamic model of conformity that permits both a conformist and a non-conformist equilibrium. We provide conditions under which conformity can 'invade' a population. More precisely, starting from a non-conformist equilibrium, we show that the conformity of an arbitrarily small proportion of the popultion can lead to the spread of conformism and the ultimate emergence of the conformist equilibrium. This occurs independently of whether or not the non-conformist equilibrium Pareto dominates the conformist equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP|
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