On the Emergence of Social Norms
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More about this item
KeywordsSocial norms; conformity; best reply;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2007-06-11 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-06-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2007-06-11 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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