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Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks

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  • Mengel, Friederike
  • Fosco, Constanza

Abstract

We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in prisoners' dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-biased imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic outcomes under a wide range of parameters. Whenever agents hold some information beyond their interaction neighbors defectors and cooperators always coexist in disconnected components. Otherwise polymorphic networks can emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors. Any stochastically stable state has at most two disconnected components. Simulations confirm our analytical results and show that the share of cooperators increases with the speed at which the network evolves, increases with the radius of interaction and decreases with the radius of information.

Suggested Citation

  • Mengel, Friederike & Fosco, Constanza, 2007. "Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks," MPRA Paper 5258, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5258
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    2. García-Martínez, José A. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2015. "Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 74-105.
    3. Ludo Waltman & Nees Eck & Rommert Dekker & Uzay Kaymak, 2013. "An Evolutionary Model of Price Competition Among Spatially Distributed Firms," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(4), pages 373-391, December.
    4. Wilson, James & Hill, J. & Kersula, M. & Wilson, C.L. & Whitsel, L. & Yan, L. & Acheson, J. & Chen, Y. & Cleaver, C. & Congdon, C. & Hayden, A. & Hayes, P. & Johnson, T. & Morehead, G. & Steneck, R. &, 2013. "Costly information and the evolution of self-organization in a small, complex economy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(S), pages 76-93.
    5. Tsakas, Nikolas, 2017. "Diffusion by imitation: The importance of targeting agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 118-151.
    6. Brañas-Garza, Pablo & Cobo-Reyes, Ramón & Espinosa, María Paz & Jiménez, Natalia & Kovárík, Jaromír & Ponti, Giovanni, 2010. "Altruism and social integration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 249-257, July.
      • Brañas Garza, Pablo & Cobo Reyes, Ramón & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Jiménez, Natalia & Kovarik, Jaromir & Ponti, Giovanni, 2009. "Altruism and Social Integration," IKERLANAK 2009-35, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
      • Brañas Garza, Pablo & Cobo Reyes, Ramón & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Jiménez, Natalia & Kovarik, Jaromir & Ponti, Giovanni, 2009. "Altruism and Social Integration," DFAEII Working Papers 2009-35, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
    7. Wilhite, Allen, 2014. "Network structure, games, and agent dynamics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 225-238.
    8. Ladley, Daniel & Wilkinson, Ian & Young, Louise, 2015. "The impact of individual versus group rewards on work group performance and cooperation: A computational social science approach," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(11), pages 2412-2425.
    9. Kovarik, Jaromir & Jiménez, Natalia & Ponti, Giovanni & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Brañas Garza, Pablo & Cobo Reyes, Ramón, 2009. "Altruism and Social Integration," IKERLANAK 2009-35, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    10. Pin, Paolo & Rogers, Brian W., 2015. "Cooperation, punishment and immigration," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 72-101.
    11. repec:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:2:p:1130-1144 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Kovarik, Jaromir & Mengel, Friederike & Romero, José Gabriel, 2012. "Learning in Network Games," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2012-66, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    13. Cui, Zhiwei, 2014. "More neighbors, more efficiency," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 103-115.
    14. Hedlund Jonas, 2012. "Altruism and Local Interaction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-27, June.
    15. Hsieh, Chih-Sheng & Lee, Lung fei, 2017. "Specification and Estimation of Network Formation and Network Interaction Models with the Exponential Probability Distribution," MPRA Paper 60726, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Daniel Ladley & Ian Wilkinson & Louise Young, 2013. "The Evolution Of Cooperation In Business: Individual Vs. Group Incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics 13/14, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
    17. Tsakas, Nikolas, 2012. "Naive learning in social networks: Imitating the most successful neighbor," MPRA Paper 37796, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Friederike Mengel, 2009. "Conformism and cooperation in a local interaction model," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 397-415, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game Theory; Cooperation; Imitation Learning; Network Formation;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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