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Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism

  • Hannelore De Silva

    ()

  • Christoph Hauert
  • Arne Traulsen
  • Karl Sigmund
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    No abstract is available for this item.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Evolutionary Economics.

    Volume (Year): 20 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 2 (April)
    Pages: 203-217

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:20:y:2010:i:2:p:203-217
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00191/index.htm

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    1. Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
    2. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matthias Sutter & Eline van der Heijden, 2006. "Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-35, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    3. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Giovanni Dosi & Giorgio Fagiolo & Andrea Roventini, 2006. "An Evolutionary Model of Endogenous Business Cycles," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 3-34, February.
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