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How Important Are IEAs for Mitigation If Countries Are of the Homo Moralis Type?

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  • Thomas Eichner
  • Rüdiger Pethig

Abstract

We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material payoff obtained on the hypothesis that all other countries act as they with predetermined probability. They are assumed to act morally w.r.t. both membership and emissions. We investigate the interaction and impact of that moral behavior on coalition formation and material payoff. The membership morality tends to increase while the emissions morality tends to decrease the coalition size, but the outcome is not smoothly determined by these opposite forces.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2024. "How Important Are IEAs for Mitigation If Countries Are of the Homo Moralis Type?," CESifo Working Paper Series 11040, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11040
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    IEA; stability; homo moralis; emissions morality; membership morality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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