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Estimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions

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Listed:
  • Boris van Leeuwen
  • Ingela Alger

Abstract

Theory suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary foundations. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run a laboratory experiment on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. We structurally estimate social preferences and Kantian morality at the individual and aggregate level. We observe considerable heterogeneity in preferences. Finite mixture analyses show that the subject pool is well described as consisting of two or three types: all display a Kantian moral concern, which they combine with aheadness aversion, behindness aversion, or both. The value of adding Kantian morality to well-established preference classes (distributional preferences as well as reciprocity) is also evaluated.

Suggested Citation

  • Boris van Leeuwen & Ingela Alger, 2024. "Estimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 665-706.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpemic:doi:10.1086/732125
    DOI: 10.1086/732125
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    Cited by:

    1. Niklas M. Witzig, 2024. "Cognitive Noise and Altruistic Preferences," Working Papers 2415, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    2. Ponthiere, Gregory, 2025. "The Whole and Its Parts: Stoic Ethics in Simple Coordination Games," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1661, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    3. Pau Juan-Bartroli & Jos'e Ignacio Rivero-Wildemauwe, 2025. "Social preferences or moral concerns: What drives rejections in the Ultimatum game?," Papers 2510.22086, arXiv.org.
    4. Lenders, Marc, 2025. "Should carbon offsets and adaptation measures be subsidized or publicly provided?," VfS Annual Conference 2025 (Cologne): Revival of Industrial Policy 325437, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Thomas Eichner & Marco Runkel, 2025. "Morality-Induced Leakage and Decentralized Environmental Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 11698, CESifo.
    6. Jean-François Laslier, 2023. "Universalization and altruism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 579-594, May.
    7. Eichner, Thomas & Runkel, Marco, 2025. "Morality-induced leakage and decentralized environmental policy," VfS Annual Conference 2025 (Cologne): Revival of Industrial Policy 325421, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Adler, Matthew & Ferranna, Maddalena & Hammitt, James K. & de Laubier, Eugénie & Treich, Nicolas, 2025. "Fair Innings: An Empirical Test," TSE Working Papers 25-1630, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    9. Roberto Sarkisian, 2021. "Optimal Incentives Schemes under Homo Moralis Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, March.
    10. Alger, Ingela, 2024. "Norms and norm change - driven by social Kantian preferences," TSE Working Papers 24-1605, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2026.
    11. Niklas M. Witzig, 2024. "Cognitive Noise and Altruistic Preferences," Papers 2410.07647, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2025.
    12. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2022. "Kantians defy the economists’ mantra of uniform Pigovian emissions taxes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    13. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2020. "The evolution of monetary equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 233-239.
    14. José Ignacio Rivero Wildemauwe, 2023. "Moral motivations in sequential buyer-seller interactions with adverse selection," Thema Working Papers 2023-11, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
    15. Charles Ayoubi & Boris Thurm, 2023. "Knowledge diffusion and morality: Why do we freely share valuable information with Strangers?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 75-99, January.
    16. Gabriel Bayle & Marc Willinger, 2025. "Efficiency of the Minimum Approval Mechanism With Heterogeneous Players," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 27(4), August.
    17. Matthew D. Adler & Maddalena Ferranna & James K. Hammitt & Eugénie de Laubier & Nicolas Treich, 2025. "Fair Innings: An Empirical Test," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(7), pages 1350-1364, July.
    18. Thomas Neuber, 2021. "Egocentric Norm Adoption," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_323, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C49 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Other
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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