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The Whole and Its Parts: Stoic Ethics in Simple Coordination Games

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  • Ponthiere, Gregory

Abstract

This paper analyzes the mechanisms by which Stoic ethics can produce coordination. We study how agents satisfying the Stoic discipline of desires (that is, one should wish for nothing that is out of control, including other players'acts) behave in 2-player simultaneous symmetric coordination games. It is shown that the extent to which the Stoic discipline of desires produces coordination depends on the particular way in which this is translated into the language of microeconomics. Under the I1 account of the Stoic discipline of desires (requiring indifference between outcomes that differ only on other players'acts), it is the case either that coordination is achieved or that coordination is valueless. Hence adopting the I1 account suffices to coordinate agents, without any need for a shared idea of the 'Common Good'. On the contrary, the I2 account of the Stoic discipline of desires (requiring indifference between outcomes that are the best given other players'acts) does not always suffice to coordinate agents.

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  • Ponthiere, Gregory, 2025. "The Whole and Its Parts: Stoic Ethics in Simple Coordination Games," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1661, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:glodps:1661
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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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