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Evolutionary Stability of Kantian Optimization

Author

Listed:
  • Philip A. Curry

    () (University of Waterloo)

  • John E. Roemer

    () (Yale University)

Abstract

In nash equilibrium, agents are autarchic in their optimization protocol, whereas in Kantian equilibrium,they optimize in an interdependent way. Typically, researchers into the evolution of homo economicus treat preferences as being determined by selective adaptation, but hold fixed the optimization protocol as autarchic. here, we ask whether natural selection might choose the optimizing protocol to be either autarchic or interdependent. That is, will Kantian players, for whom the stable concept is Kantian equilibrium drive nash players (for whom the stable concept is nash equilibrium) to extinction, or otherwise? The answer depends upon whether players can signal their type to others.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip A. Curry & John E. Roemer, 2012. "Evolutionary Stability of Kantian Optimization," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 200(1), pages 131-146, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2012:v:200:i:1:p:131-146.
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    2. Nick Netzer, 2009. "Evolution of Time Preferences and Attitudes toward Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 937-955, June.
    3. Arthur J. Robson & Larry Samuelson, 2009. "The Evolution of Time Preference with Aggregate Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1925-1953, December.
    4. Curry, Philip A., 2001. "Decision Making under Uncertainty and the Evolution of Interdependent Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 357-369, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2018. "Uninvadable social behaviors and preferences in group-structured populations," IAST Working Papers 18-73, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    2. Roemer, John E., 2015. "Kantian optimization: A microfoundation for cooperation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 45-57.
    3. Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2018. "Uninvadable social behaviors and preferences in group-structured populations," TSE Working Papers 18-888, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Kantian equilibrium; nash equilibrium; evolutionary Stable Strategy; cooperation;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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