Evolutionary Stability of Kantian Optimization
In nash equilibrium, agents are autarchic in their optimization protocol, whereas in Kantian equilibrium,they optimize in an interdependent way. Typically, researchers into the evolution of homo economicus treat preferences as being determined by selective adaptation, but hold fixed the optimization protocol as autarchic. here, we ask whether natural selection might choose the optimizing protocol to be either autarchic or interdependent. That is, will Kantian players, for whom the stable concept is Kantian equilibrium drive nash players (for whom the stable concept is nash equilibrium) to extinction, or otherwise? The answer depends upon whether players can signal their type to others.
Volume (Year): 200 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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- Curry, Philip A., 2001. "Decision Making under Uncertainty and the Evolution of Interdependent Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 357-369, June.
- Nick Netzer, 2009.
"Evolution of Time Preferences and Attitudes toward Risk,"
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American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 937-55, June.
- Nick Netzer, 2008. "Evolution of Time Preferences and Attitudes Towards Risk," TWI Research Paper Series 29, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universitï¿½t Konstanz.
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