Public Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution
How can a desire to cooperate in one-shot interactions survive, even though it gives a material disadvantage to its carrier? I analyze this issue using a one-shot public goods game between two altruistic individuals. Within a pair, the least altruistic individual is better off materially. Between pairs, individuals in the pair with the highest degree of altruism are better off materially. I determine the evolutionarily stable degree of altruism, allowing for assortative matching. The stable degree of altruism is strictly smaller than the degree of assortativity, and it may be negative. It is also increasing in the degree of assortativity. For a given degree of assortativity, the stable degree of altruism depends on the relative strength of the within-pair and the between-group e¤ect on material welfare. This relative strength in turn depends on the production and cost functions in the underlying public goods game.
|Date of creation:||26 Aug 2009|
|Date of revision:||01 Feb 2010|
|Publication status:||Published: Revised version in Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 12, No. 4 (August 2010), pp. 789–813|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
|Order Information:|| Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Theodore C. Bergstrom, .
"On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings,"
ELSE working papers
017, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 58-81, March.
- Ted Bergstrom, . "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," Papers _023, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
- B. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran & Robert J. Oxoby, 2011. "Us and `Them': the origin of identity, and its economic implications," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(3), pages 719-748, August.
- Robin P. Cubitt & Michalis Drouvelis & Simon Gächter, 2008.
"Framing and Free Riding: Emotional Responses and Punishment in Social Dilemma Games,"
2008-02, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Robin Cubitt & Michalis Drouvelis & Simon Gächter, 2011. "Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 254-272, May.
- Robin P. Cubitt & Michalis Drouvelis & Simon Gächter, 2008. "Framing and Free Riding: Emotional Responses and Punishment in Social Dilemma Games," Discussion Papers 2008-02, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Donald Cox & Bruce E. Hansen & Emmanuel Jimenez, 1997.
"How Responsive are Private Transfers to Income? Evidence from a Laissez-Faire Economy,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
341., Boston College Department of Economics, revised 01 Dec 1999.
- Cox, Donald & Hansen, Bruce E. & Jimenez, Emmanuel, 2004. "How responsive are private transfers to income? Evidence from a laissez-faire economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 2193-2219, August.
- Guido Tabellini, 2007.
"The Scope of Cooperation: values and incentives,"
328, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Oechssler, Jörg & Riedel, Frank, 2000.
"On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models,"
SFB 373 Discussion Papers
2000,73, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Oechssler, Jorg & Riedel, Frank, 2002. "On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 223-252, December.
- Joerg Oechssler & Frank Riedel, 2000. "On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models," Game Theory and Information 0004004, EconWPA.
- Jörg Oechssler & Frank Riedel, 2000. "On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse7_2000, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Ingela Alger & Jörgen Weibull, 2009.
"Kinship, Incentives and Evolution,"
- Bester, Helmut & Guth, Werner, 1998. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 193-209, February.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2006.
"Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2008. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 990-1008, June.
- Jung-Kyoo Choi, 2008. "Play locally, learn globally: group selection and structural basis of cooperation," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 239-257, December.
- Possajennikov, Alex, 2000. "On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 125-129, May.
- James M. Walker & Matthew A. Halloran, 2004. "Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 235-247, October.
- Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
- Joseph Henrich & Robert Boyd & Samuel Bowles & Colin Camerer & Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis & Richard McElreath & Michael Alvard & Abigail Barr & Jean Ensminger & Kim Hill & Francisco Gil-White & Micha, 2001. "Economic Man in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in Fifteen Small-Scale Societies," Working Papers 01-11-063, Santa Fe Institute.
- Bolle, Friedel, 2000. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable? And envy and malevolence?: Remarks on Bester and Guth," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 131-133, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:car:carecp:09-06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Renee Lortie)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.