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Nash versus Kant: a game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Philippe De Donder

    (Toulouse School of Economics, CNRS, University Toulouse Capitole)

  • Humberto Llavador

    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona School of Economics)

  • Stefan P. Penczynski

    (University of East Anglia)

  • John E. Roemer

    (Yale University)

  • Roberto Vélez-Grajales

    (Centro Estudios Espinosa Yglesias (CEEY))

Abstract

The vaccination game exhibits positive externalities. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively, optimizing according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We develop a random utility model of vaccination behavior and prove that the equilibrium coverage rate is larger with the Kant protocol than with the Nash one. Using survey data collected from six countries, we calibrate the parameters of the vaccination game, compute both Nash equilibrium and Kantian equilibrium profiles, and compare them with observed vaccination behavior. We find evidence that parents demonstrate cooperative behavior in all six countries. The study highlights the importance of cooperation in shaping vaccination behavior and underscores the need to consider these factors in public health interventions.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe De Donder & Humberto Llavador & Stefan P. Penczynski & John E. Roemer & Roberto Vélez-Grajales, 2025. "Nash versus Kant: a game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 145(2), pages 97-128, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:145:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s00712-025-00898-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-025-00898-x
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    Keywords

    Kantian equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; Measles vaccination; Free-rider problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior

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