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Strategic Immunization and Group Structure

Author

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  • Andrea Galeotti
  • Brian Rogers

Abstract

We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative assortative interactions generate highly asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between ex-ante identical groups. When groups have an underlying di erence, even a small amount of inter-group contacts generates large asymmetries. JEL Code: D61, H51, i14

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Galeotti & Brian Rogers, 2012. "Strategic Immunization and Group Structure," Discussion Papers 1551, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1552
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Scott Barrett, 2003. "Global Disease Eradication," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 591-600, 04/05.
    2. Barrett, Scott & Hoel, Michael, 2007. "Optimal disease eradication," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, pages 627-652.
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    7. Federico Echenique & Roland G. Fryer Jr & Alex Kaufman, 2006. "Is School Segregation Good or Bad?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 265-269.
    8. Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2010. "Recurrent Infection and Externalities in Prevention," CEPR Discussion Papers 8112, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    10. Geoffard, Pierre-Yves & Philipson, Tomas, 1997. "Disease Eradication: Private versus Public Vaccination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 222-230.
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    12. Michael Kremer, 1996. "Integrating Behavioral Choice into Epidemiological Models of AIDS," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(2), pages 549-573.
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    14. Michael Kremer, 1996. "Integrating Behavioral Choice into Epidemiological Models of the AIDS Epidemic," NBER Working Papers 5428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cerdeiro, Diego A., 2017. "Contagion exposure and protection technology," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 230-254.
    2. repec:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:155-176 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Acemoglu, Daron & Malekian, Azarakhsh & Ozdaglar, Asu, 2016. "Network security and contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 536-585.
    4. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vigier, Adrien, 2015. "Interaction, protection and epidemics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 64-69.
    5. Panebianco, Fabrizio & Verdier, Thierry, 2015. "Paternalism, Cultural Transmission and Diffusion on Complex Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 10722, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vigier, Adrien, 2015. "Interaction, protection and epidemics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 64-69.
    7. Zenou, Yves, 2014. "Key Players," CEPR Discussion Papers 10277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Diffusion; SIS; externalities;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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