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Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation

  • Boncinelli, Leonardo
  • Pin, Paolo

We analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different notions of stability: myopic team-wise stability, which extends to our setup the concept of pair-wise stability, coalitional stability, where agents are perfectly rational and able to coordinate, and stochastic stability, where agents are myopic and errors occur with vanishing probability. We find that, in many cases, coalitional stability in no way refines myopic team-wise stability, while stochastically stable states are feasible states that maximize the overall number of activities performed by teams.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 56356.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2014
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:56356
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