IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v192y2021ics0022053121000041.html

Lock-in through passive connections

Author

Listed:
  • Cui, Zhiwei
  • Weidenholzer, Simon

Abstract

We consider a model of social coordination and network formation where agents decide on an action in a coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We study the role of passive connections; these are links that other agents form to a given agent. Such passive connections may create an endogenously arising form of lock-in where agents don't switch actions and links, as this may result in a loss of payoff received through them. When agents are constrained in the number of links they form, the set of Nash equilibria includes action-heterogenous strategy profiles, where different agents choose different actions. Depending on the precise parameters of the model, risk-dominant, payoff-dominant, or action-heterogenous strategy profiles are stochastically stable.

Suggested Citation

  • Cui, Zhiwei & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2021. "Lock-in through passive connections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:192:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000041
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105187
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053121000041
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105187?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lu, Feifei, 2023. "Local information hinders coordination in endogenous networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
    2. Cui, Zhiwei, 2023. "Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 410-430.
    3. Markus Kinateder & Luca Paolo Merlino, 2021. "The Evolution of Networks and Local Public Good Provision: A Potential Approach," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-12, July.
    4. Cui, Zhiwei & Jiang, Ge & Shi, Fei, 2023. "Size-dependent minimum-effort games and constrained interactions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
    5. Ziwei Wang & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Preference Evolution under Partner Choice," Papers 2304.11504, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2025.
    6. Li, Xueheng, 2026. "Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 228-249.
    7. Cui, Zhiwei & Liu, Jinhua, 2024. "Homophily in network formation and social coordination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
    8. Lu, Feifei & Shi, Fei, 2023. "Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 645-665.
    9. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Sedric Zucchiatti, 2025. "The structure of interaction and modes of reasoning can shape the evolution of conventions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(2), pages 1-20, December.
    10. Leonardo Boncinelli & Alessio Muscillo & Paolo Pin, 2022. "Correction to: Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1130-1130, December.
    11. Cui, Zhiwei & Shi, Fei, 2022. "Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 37-51.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:192:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000041. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.