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Stochastic stability in best shot network games

  • Boncinelli, Leonardo
  • Pin, Paolo

The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It generally has a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. We show that, depending on how we define perturbations – i.e., possible mistakes that agents make – we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable states. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of a contributing agent that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable states are Nash equilibria with the largest contribution.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000413
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 75 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 538-554

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:538-554
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.001
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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